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Summary 
Extension of loans is being considered as one of the most important and useful 
functions of the universal commercial banks in the economy. Russian banking has been 
gradually restoring after the financial crises, when the default on the government debt has 
showed that only those banks that are more concerned with the non-financial sector can 
survive external shocks. However, the fact that banks become more and more willing to 
extend loans to the corporate sector, due to the absence of other profitable financial 
instruments, exposes them more to risks of particular borrowers. Unpredictable 
macroeconomic conditions and inefficient contract enforcement mechanism are overlapped 
with risks of borrowers’ performance and value of their guaranties. To ensure themselves 
from risks on the micro level banks need to undertake costly and time-consuming process of 
assessment of their potential clients. In the situation when interacting parties possess 
different information or some data is not verifiable, credit relations demand not only a sound 
banking system and high management qualification, but also stability of financial records of 
the firms. Economic theory addresses different questions on this matter, and even we 
abstract from the commitment and moral hazard problem on the banks side, there exist a 
plenty of informational issues concerning borrowers.  
Even general financial situation is improving; small and medium size enterprises in 
Russia are constrained in resources. Most of them cannot undertake cumbersome and 
expensive procedure of issuing public debt. Newly emerged enterprises do not have credit 
history and performance records, and even those that have been working quite efficiently 
during a certain period cannot provide reliable financial documentation due to the presence 
of underground activities. High credit risks and costs due to the difficulties in assessing and 
choosing potential borrowers in the situation of informational imperfections are reflected in 
the interest rate on loans. As a result, enterprises with stable but not very high profitability, 
that is usual for non-financial sector, are constraint in their access to credit resources. 
While the situation in Russian banking is generally improving, risk of bad debts may 
affect the future of their financial stability. So both sides require recommendations in 
developing their strategies and possibility to rely on adapted theories of credit relations. In 
this respect, we illustrate bank-borrower relationships and bank decisions on the credit 
market in the context of the two game-theoretic models. We consider factors that influence 
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the interest rate on loans and especially particular conditions of the Russian credit market i.e. 
costs and uncertainty related to the pledged assets, wide tax evasion and non-payments in the 
economy along with an absence of the standardise financial records of the borrowers. In the 
first model, banks, as Cournot oligopolists, extend loans to finance production of the firms 
on the security of collateral. Firms have two types of technology available, and a choice 
between them depends on the level of prudence in the society and cost of loans, through 
such specific factor as firm’s collateral valuation. Collateral requirements, set by the bank, 
are quite high and cover the principle with all interest and costs. But if the firms are able to 
provide falsified documentation and use illegally pledged assets, they will put a low value on 
their collateral in a loan agreement with a bank. Thus, particular conditions may lead to the 
choice of a risky investment, while improvement in the legal enforcement and relatively low 
interest rates will make a stable one more profitable. 
The second model is based on the theory of signalling and provides a more detailed 
analysis of the interest rate decisions of a representative bank that provides loans to the non-
financial sector. In the present state of the Russian economy, enterprises are engaged in the 
tax evasion and maintain arrears no matter their actual profitability and investment 
possibilities. Due to financial uncertainty banks are not able to distinguish potentially 
creditworthy borrowers, and therefore insure themselves with high interest rates on loans. 
Enterprises can try to build more transparent relationships with banks and provide them with 
information indicating their performance and ability to repay loans. 
A bank’s decision at a fist stage of the game depends on whether it can distinguish 
between the two types of borrowers: with high and low investment risks. In order to obtain 
cheaper loans, the high quality (i.e. low risk) firms need to distinguish themselves from a 
homogeneous mass. We obtain a possibility for the latter firms to provide a credible signal to 
the bank through the improvement in their financial performance. The model’s results 
suggest that high quality firms can adjust their behaviour by refraining from chronicle non-
payments in return for better credit conditions. This will serve as an indication of their 
efficient performance and ability to repay loans. The bank then conducts a particular credit 
policy separating high-risk borrowers from the low-risk ones and adjusts its interest rate on 
loans accordingly. L-type firms will continue to borrow at a high rate, as due to the limited 
liability and high upper values of their return distribution they benefit more from investing 
than from forgoing the project. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial institutions interact with other agents and fulfil an important role of the 
allocation of pecuniary resources from those who are willing to supply temporary free funds 
to those who require them for their current activities. Extension of loans is being considered 
as one of the most important and useful roles of the universal commercial banks in the 
economy.1 Banks benefit more from economies of scale and scope advantages and higher 
diversification opportunities than other market agents engaged in the credit market.2 
Extensive empirical research shows that the amount of lending to non-financial sector has 
real effects on the economy, and thus a decline in it could trigger negative outcomes.3 
Moreover, seeking profitability in non-traditional activities like securities and derivatives 
lead to instability of the financial system and negative financial consequences for the non-
financial economy.4 
Russian banking has been gradually restoring after the financial crisis of 1998, which 
was one of the worst since the emergence of independent commercial banks in Russia in 
1988. Due to the continuing formation of the financial markets, banks have an extremely 
tight array of alternative investment opportunities. Before and some period after the crisis, 
they were engaged almost totally in speculative activities on the money market including 
short-term investments in government debt (treasury bills). With some economic 
stabilisation, easy inflationary profits have become less possible for financial intermediaries 
and also the default on the government debt shows that only those banks that are more 
concerned with the industrial sectors can survive external shocks. However, loan extension 
continued to be a difficult and uncertain activity especially due to its longer horizon and 
inefficient risk management strategies. So most of the banks have been widely engaged in 
foreign exchange and other money-markets operation providing themselves a sufficient 
combination of current liquidity and profit. Nevertheless, being in transition from 
                                                          
1 Empirical research provides a support to the hypothesis of the uniqueness of banks loans compared with other possible 
activities (Fama, 1985; James, 1987). Recent empirical analysis confirms a positive relationship between financial and 
economic development of the country (Levine, 1997), specifically economic growth, savings rates and capital accumulation 
(Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000).  
2 Banks can gain from economies of scale (Lenard and Pyle, 1977; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Diamond, 1984, 1991) and 
an intrinsically efficient role of banks is in optimal investment decisions and screening of corporate borrowers  (Campbell, 
1979), monitoring them and predicting their future performance (Diamond, 1984); and also risk management as a new 
phenomenon (Scholtens and van Wensveen, 2000; Allen and Santomero, 2001).  
3 Christopher (1987). 
2 
speculative profits towards more stable banking, most of them began to adjust their 
management policy searching for new market niches and other sufficiently profitable 
possibilities of asset allocation. They now make attempts to establish closer relations with 
the corporate sector, offering a wider range of services, improving techniques of client’s 
business evaluation and, of course, providing financing for reliable borrowers.  
However, the fact that banks become more and more willing to extend loans to the 
corporate sector due to the absence of other profitable financial instruments exposes them 
more to specific credit risks along with general macroeconomics risks. Unpredictable 
macroeconomic conditions and inefficient contract-enforcement mechanisms are overlapped 
with particular risks of borrowers’ performance and value of their guarantees. To insure 
themselves against at least some risks on the micro level, banks need to undertake a costly 
and time-consuming process of assessment of the potential borrower. This requires not only 
well-qualified management qualification but also a stability of borrowers’ financial records. 
Moreover, banks encounter a lot of obstacles, including legislation imperfections, 
informational uncertainty, and mainly absence of transparent financial documentation 
including standardised accounting and credit records. This is one of the most concerns in the 
provision of loans to potential and new clients. Informational problems makes it difficult to 
distinguish reliable borrowers, who are conducting sound economic activities and are 
potentially creditworthy, from those who are unable to repay their debts.  
Giving up the possibility of irrational behaviour of the agents, we will try to provide 
some suggestions for improving borrower-lender interactions on the Russian credit market. 
Apparently, with a lack of financial instruments, banks are turning back to traditional 
banking services and at the same time try to improve the quality and variety of operations for 
customers. However, enlarging the loan portfolio is risky and may involve a high percentage 
of bad debts. Banks try to insure themselves from risks with higher interest rate so that credit 
conditions are very troublesome and detrimental for potential borrowers.  
In this respect, we illustrate bank-borrower relationships and bank decisions on the 
credit market in the context of two game-theoretic models. In the thesis, we consider factors 
that influence the interest rate on loans and especially particular conditions of the Russian 
credit market i.e. costs and uncertainty related to the pledged assets, wide tax evasion and 
non-payments in the economy along with an absence of the standardise financial records of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
4 Edwards and Mihkin (1995) study the effects of the decline in traditional banking in favour of more risky operations with 
derivatives and off-balance sheet activities observed in many developed countries. 
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the borrowers. In the first model banks, as Cournot oligopolists, extend loans in return for a 
collateral to finance production of the enterprises. The latter have one stable and one risky 
technology available, and a choice between them depends on the level of prudence in the 
society and cost of loans, through such specific factor as firm’s collateral valuation. Thus, 
particular conditions may lead to the choice of a risky investment, while improvement in the 
legal enforcement and relatively low interest rates will make a stable one more profitable. 
The second model is based on the theory of signalling and provides a more detailed 
analysis of the interest rate decisions of a representative bank that provides loans to the non-
financial sector. In the present state of the Russian economy, enterprises are engaged in the 
tax evasion and maintain arrears no matter their actual profitability and investment 
possibilities. In the situation of high risks and financial uncertainty, banks are not able to 
distinguish potentially creditworthy borrowers and insure themselves therefore with high 
interest rates on loans. Enterprises can try to build more transparent relationships with banks 
and provide them with information indicating their performance and ability to repay loans. 
Both sides require recommendations in developing their strategies and possibility to rely on 
adapted theories of credit relations. Bank’s decision at a fist stage of the game depends on 
the fact whether it can distinguish between the two types of borrowers: with high and low 
investment risks. In order to obtain cheaper loans, the high quality (i.e. low risk) firms need 
to distinguish themselves from a homogeneous mass. We obtain a possibility for the latter to 
provide a signal to the bank through the improvement in their financial performance.  
In section 2 we provide a brief history of the development of the Russian credit 
market, including the current situation on the market for corporate loans and problems with 
the enterprise financing. Section 3 describes the related literature, and section 4 discusses 
problems specific to the Russian credit market. In section 5, we model decisions of banks as 
Cournot oligopolies and show implications of the collateral cost and valuation. Section 6 
develops a signalling model and suggests implications of the interest rate for 
indistinguishable borrowers, as well as elaboration of signalling possibilities for them. 
Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Russian credit market: history and present 
specific conditions 
2.1 A brief history of the development of the Russian 
credit market 
The actual beginning of the reforms dates back to 1988 when the sole functioning of 
the State Bank was replaced by the tree-level bank system of the former USSR.  The first 
stage was marked by the appearance of specialised banks, financing particular areas of the 
economy, before the independent commercial banks emerged. The whole system has been 
regulated by the Central Bank from that time on (known as Gosbank in the former USSR), 
while specialised banks were transformed to the commercial banks afterwards. The banking 
system received independence from the state, at least formally, while presence of the 
specialised banks maintained signs of the old system. Their main functions included 
persistent financing of related industries on the favourable for the latter conditions. Thus, 
these banks had narrow and specified functions in the absence of any financial markets.  
Only in 1991 was the banking system set up according to the practice known in the 
West, in particular in its bank-dominating form as in Germany and Japan5. Commercial 
banks are responsible for their really independent managing decisions and have relatively 
equal conditions under the new banking legislation and supervision of their local branch of 
the Central Bank. Newly appeared commercial banks have faced unfamiliar tasks such as 
investment and risk management. With the appearance of the financial markets they received 
also an opportunity of portfolio management using securities and money market instruments 
beyond traditional lending. 
As the economic and financial situation produced high inflation, making high 
inflationary money became a very profitable business for the Russian financial sector. Thus, 
most banks almost completely turned towards speculative operations on the money market 
and short-term investments in bonds and shares. This situation was aggravated by the fact 
that Russian banks were already established as universal organisations with a standard range 
                                                          
5 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) compare "Anglo-Saxon" and "German-Japanese" financing practices and consider a level 
of decentralisation as a source of financial discipline. 
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of services.6 Thus, they jeopardised their customers’ money and threatened repayments to 
their depositors by being involved in risky operations. During following financial crises and 
bank-runs, many of banks went bankrupt but some of them, those with more flexible and 
qualified management, survived and even acquired large assets. They didn’t match assets 
and liabilities, although, in some cases, new banks, free from any obligations, emerged on 
the ruins of the old ones.  
2.2 The current situation in the market for corporate 
loans 
Economic instability and information problems create highly risky environment for 
the banks operations. During the period of high-inflation profits, banks were exposed to 
speculative risks of money-market operations and government debt financing. All 
transactions were extremely short-horizon and usually provided sufficient liquidity. 
Following changes in the asset structure demand more attention to the credit risks and asset 
duration risks.7  
Stabilisation and potential signs of growth in the Russian economy have a positive 
influence on the banking system. A tendency of overcoming consequences of the systemic 
crises was reinforced in year 2001. Banks’ assets8 and capital9 have been continuing to grow 
significantly (i.e. current nominal value of bank assets has been increased more than three 
times since the beginning of 1999 and constituted 3156 bill. rub. on the beginning of 2002). 
A process of the consolidation of banking capital goes along with a continuing decrease in 
the number of banks, as is seen from the figure 1, even after the disappearance of the main 
crisis consequences.10  
 
 
 
                                                          
6 Positive and negative sides of the universal and specialised banks are discussed on the Ber, Jasef and Yosha (2001). 
7 This and all following information on the banking system are taken from the banking statistics of the Central Bank of the 
Russian Federation (monetary indicators and banking statistical bulletins). All data is aggregated on a monthly basis from 
the balance sheets of banks, including their branches abroad.   
8 Assets include credit extended to non-financial sector, banks and households; investment in shares, bills and government 
securities; corporate and budgetary funds with banks; personal deposits and negotiable debt. 
9 Data on own funds is from the capital accounts of banks and includes authorised capital, which is based on shares and 
provides a minimal amount of assets as a guarantee for depositors, supplementary capital and other funds formed through 
profits, reserves formed to cover possible losses on active transactions, current-year financial results and profits/losses of 
previous years. 
10 Number of banks is represented by the registered credited institutions. The yearly numbers of actually functioning banks 
are indicated below in the table 2. 
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Figure 1.     
A number of credit institutions in Russia, dynamics of their total assets and  
corporate loans extended (April 1998- December 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1999 and almost through 2000, the share of loans constituted a lower percentage 
of Russia's gross domestic product than before the crisis of 1998. However, banks' loan 
portfolios have begun to grow at an extraordinary pace due to the lack of the possibilities of 
profitable asset allocation. 
Table 1. 
CREDITS EXTENDED11 
(at the beginning of quarter; bln. roubles) 
 To enterprises   and   
organizations12 
To  banks13 to individuals14 
    
1998 II quarter 196,3 29,4 18,2 
1998 III quarter 201,1 33,8 18,5 
1998 IV quarter 287,8 55,3 22,2 
1999 I quarter 300.2 58.2 20.1 
1999 II quarter 329.6 71.9 22.8 
1999 III quarter 331.7 77.0 22.3 
1999 IV quarter 354.5 83.6 26.1 
                                                          
11 Data of the State Committee of Statistics (Goskomstat) 
12 Excluding credits to non-resident legal entities. 
13 Excluding deposits and other funds deposited with the banks. 
14 Including credits to individuals - private entrepreneurs and non-residents. 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
ap
r.9
8
jun
.98
au
g.9
8
ok
t.9
8
de
s.9
8
feb
.99
ap
r.9
9
jun
.99
au
g.9
9
ok
t.9
9
de
s.9
9
feb
.00
ap
r.0
0
jun
.00
au
g.0
0
ok
t.0
0
de
s.0
0
feb
.01
ap
r.0
1
jun
.01
au
g.0
1
ok
t.0
1
de
s.0
1
mil.rub.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
number of banks (right axis)
total banks assets
corporate loans
7 
2000 I quarter 445.2 89.7 27.6 
2000 II quarter 483.6 94.4 30.3 
2000 III quarter 543.9 83.0 35.0 
2000 IV quarter 626.5 110.0 42.5 
2001 I quarter 763.3 104.7 44.7 
The main progress has been achieved by the change in the structure of revenues 
(figure 2), which are now mainly due to the increase in the credit operations, in contrast to 
government securities in 1996-1997 and currency operations in 1998-1999.  
Figure 2 
Banks’ asset allocation (quarterly data for 1998 - 2001)15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The market for government debt failed to retain its pre-crisis amounts (i.e. 10 % in 
the beginning of 2002 versus 22 % in April 1998). Its reliability and liquidity highly 
decreased after the default of 1998 and banks do not credit the government in large amounts 
anymore. Operations on the corporate stock market continue to be negligibly small with only 
1-2% of the total assets.  Low volumes and liquidity, high volatility and risks make it 
uninteresting for the banks unless they decide on purchasing shares for corporate control 
purposes. Thus, credits to the non-financial sector gradually become the main source of 
banks' revenues. 
The share of loans extended to the corporate sector out of total assets of major banks 
approaches 40 per cent on the end of 2001, which is the highest value since 1994. Loans in 
                                                          
15 Corporate loans and credit to households and banks include debt overdue. Funds provided on REPO terms are shown as 
allocation into securities. 
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domestic currency have always been in a higher demand by enterprises due to the high 
exchange risks, and now their share in the banks` loan portfolio is increasing. Thus, a current 
positive tendency of stabilisation and growth of the banking sector is based on the increasing 
credit portfolio. However, it will continue to be positive only in the absence of bad debts and 
perseverance of good quality of extended loans. As it is seen from the figure 3, nominal 
outstanding debt to corporate borrowers is quite high and doesn’t have any clear decreasing 
tendency. To some extent it can be justified by enlarged lending and hopefully overdue debt 
is growing at a relatively lower pace.  
Figure 3 
Nominal value of the outstanding debt on loans and 
growth rates of outstanding debt and loans extended (1998 - 2001) 
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During 2001, the share of outstanding loans constituted 3 per cent in the banks' credit 
portfolio that is almost twice as low as before the crisis of 1998. Nevertheless, credit 
expansion may lead to its increase as banks broaden their client bases and enhance extension 
of loans to existing clients. 
In the current situation of low information transparency and high exposure to risks in 
the entrepreneurial activities, an almost total orientation on credit operations will lead to a 
deterioration of banks’ assets if banks will not use new strategies towards borrowers. Credit 
institutions need to conduct a quite sensitive policy according to the borrowers’ potential and 
creditworthiness. 
It is interesting to compare Russian the situation with the banking industry in Poland, 
another transitional country whose banking is known for its quality guaranteed by 
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transparency and confirmed by the absence of banking crises.16 It has performed quite well 
since the period of similar to Russia financial problems of 1992-1994. Domestic lending is 
one of the most important segments of their activities, as Poland became the first country in 
Eastern Europe that managed to maintain stable growth of bank loans provided to the non-
financial sector. It has been indicated a 15.7% (9.7% in real terms) increase in gross loans.17 
In 1999, the share of loans to the non-financial sector constituted 41% of total aggregate 
assets of the commercial banks. Deposits, which traditionally are the core source of funding 
for banks, accounted for 60% of the liabilities of Polish banks versus approximately 45% of 
total aggregate liabilities of Russian banks. These figures still support the idea that the 
lending activities of Russian banks are far, not only from sound financial behaviour, but also 
from the time-honoured approach in assets-liabilities management. 
2.3 Problems with enterprise financing 
The last few years have resulted in some improvement in the economic situation of 
Russian industries. The non-financial sector has started a gradual recovery with more or less 
successful signs depending on the particular sector, such as demand of its goods and general 
economic conditions favouring production.  
Table 2 
MAIN INDICATORS18 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Gross Domestic Product: bln. 
roubles (in current market prices) 
2256 2562,6 2696.4 4607.0 6946.5  
as percentage of the previous year 
(in constant prices) 
95,1 100,8 95.1 103.5 107.7  
Volume of industrial output (in  
actual prices)19 , bln. roubles 
1414,2 1601 1681 2995 4763  
Number of enterprises, thous. 156 159 159 158 158  
Number of credit organisations 
registered on the territory of the 
Russian Federation (at the 
beginning of the year) 
  2555 2483 2378 2126 
Including functioning credit 
organisations 
  1697 1476 1349 1311 
Investments in fixed capital  541,6 402,4 670.4 1165.2  
Volume index of investments in 
fixed capital (in constant prices), 
  93.3 105.3 117.4  
                                                          
16 Economic Survey of Poland (OECD, January 2000). 
17 All data form the summary evaluation of the financial situation of the polish banks (National Bank of Poland, 2000). 
18 Data of the State Committee of Statistics (Goskomstat) 
19 Taking into account informal activities. 
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as percentage of the previous year 
of which by sources of financing: 
from total 10020 
      
Retained earnings 52,2 60,8 53,6 53,4 46.1  
Out of them: profit at disposal of 
organisation 
 11,9 13,3 16,2 23.4  
Attracted funds 8,4  7,1 46,4 46,6 53.9  
Out of them: budget funds (funds 
of the consolidated budget) 
20,1 20,7 19,2 17,4 21.2  
In spite of the beginning of the economic recovery there are still many inefficiencies, 
and entrepreneurs have to run their businesses in the same difficult macroeconomic and 
legislative environment. A complex tax system with an unbearable tax burden 
(approximately one third of profits in the case of profit tax) condemns a significant part of 
the companies to operate in the underground economy. Shortage in financing has been 
experiencing by a significant part of enterprises and still keeping barter and non-payment in 
the economy among other negative tendencies.21 Growth of the nominal and real gross 
domestic product, industrial output and investments is accompanied by a positive tendency 
of decreasing overdue debt of industrial enterprises (see figure 4), which started in the 
middle of 2001.22 However, overdue debt still shows quite high values, which has not yet 
reached before-crises values. 
Figure 4 
Quarterly dynamics of the gross fixed investment and industrial overdue debt  
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The economy experiences a large deficit of funds, as many Russian enterprises 
require resources for different purposes, from solving short-term liquidity problems, 
                                                          
20  For the large and medium size enterprises. 
21 Dolgopyatova (1998). 
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purchasing raw materials and supplements, as working capital financing, to investments in 
machinery renovation and production expansion. Table 2 represents a structure of 
investments in fixed capital, which are almost equally financed by own and attracted funds, 
where quite large part of the later is due to the budget financing. There was a first large drop 
in the amount of the budget support to the industrial sector in 1998, which aggravated their 
investment problems. For example, in the end of 1998, 82 per cent of the examined 
enterprises were already detached from budget financing but near 70 per cent of them didn't 
use bank loans.23 They tried to utilise their internal funds, if any, while only 17 per cent of 
companies used credit resources and only 3 per cent - foreign investments.  
Developed financial markets usually provide a possibility of issuing direct debt, 
equity or using trade credit. Currently only limited number of firms in Russia can afford a 
procedure of issuing bonds;24 even in with the efficient capital markets external public debt 
can be considered as a cheaper and more flexible source compared with bank loans.25 Trade 
credit is costly and thus many enterprises can appeal mainly to bank loans.26 Presumably 
small and medium-size firms can also experience problems with obtaining loans.27 They are 
usually more flexible, engaged in different kinds of activities, and have a lower probability 
of being checked by the authorities; thus their performance is less observable. Large 
enterprises are more in the centre of public attention, their activities are observed and 
evaluated by the market, and so it is easier to distinguish their creditworthiness. Typically 
they are permanent clients of particular banks, which provide specific customary services for 
them, including financing. Moreover, due to the customer-creditor relationships they can get 
quite mild credit conditions. At the same time, some of the large enterprises, inherited from 
the soviet economy, obtain governmental subsidies through banks, but it is done by means of 
different mechanism and decisions are made not by the bank themselves.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
22 Information is based on the data from the key economic indicators, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics and 
East European Studies.  
23 Data according to the sociological investigation of the Center of Economic Research  
24 The reason is that the whole process is quite complicated and requires large initial costs in the form of tax payments 
(0.8% from the face value of issued securities). Moreover, the firm should pay to financial consultants and marketmakers, 
who organize and support the market for these securities, or just bear the costs undertaking the whole procedure by itself). 
25 More stable firms are able to raise public financing due to their market reputation, and they will prefer it to the bank 
loans as they usually pay lower interest on the former funds. Boot and Thakor (1997) consider a  coexistence of bank loans 
and external financing and a possible dominance of one of them. The firms with a lower reputation have a tendency to 
borrow from the bank, while other borrow from the capital markets. 
26 However, if we consider possible credit rationing trade credit is the more likely outcome for the small firms without 
stable bank relationships (Biais and Gollier, 1997). 
27 There is a contradiction between the theory of funds availability for financing positive NPV projects and known reality 
of capital shortages of small companies. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) suggested possible explanations of this phenomenon in 
terms of information asymmetries and agency costs. 
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Hence, it is more interesting to consider crediting decisions of banks with respect to 
different numerous small and medium size firms. On the one hand, their demand and 
repayment possibilities are constrained by the prevailing high interest rate. On the other 
hand, they are less distinguishable by the external parties and their operations are more 
plagued by shadow activities. Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the interest rate on corporate 
loans and deposits 28, Central Bank refinancing rate (i.e. a formal rate used by the Central 
Bank for its operations in the open market) and consumer price index.29  
Figure 5 
Interest rates dynamics (1999-2001) 
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Deciding on the required rate of return on their investments, banks take into account 
high risks of borrowers, especially due to their uncertain future performance, collateral value 
and ambiguous financial records. Large part of the interest rate margin on the corporate 
loans includes this type of uncertainty in the credit decisions. 
Consequently, many companies with good market perspectives cannot finance their 
sustainable development because of various reasons. A successful recovery of manufacturing 
and agriculture requires vast investments in their capital and current assets along with 
financing innovations and new competitive technologies. Moreover, the shortage of 
investments increases the share of unproductive activities in the economy, lows profitability 
                                                          
28 Interest rate on both loans and deposits are taken as an average weighted on length of the loan/deposit for industrial 
sector respectively. 
29 Average percentage change in the consumer price index. 
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and slows economic growth.30 It is important to have a more developed investment market 
including loans to the non-financial sector, leasing operations and investment projects 
financing, which will considerably support development in industries. It is appealing to 
elaborate on a proposal for improvement from the part of enterprises, which want to obtain 
cheaper loans proving their financial reliability and creditworthiness. 
 
                                                          
30 Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) discuss relationship between the level of the financial 
development and economic performance. 
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3. Description of some related literature 
Not only a sound banking system31 but also the financial stability of borrowers play 
an important role in the situation when interacting parties possess different information or 
some data is not verifiable. Economic theory addresses various questions on this matter and 
even if we abstract from the commitment and moral hazard32 problem on the bank side there 
exist plenty of informational issues concerning borrowers. 
Informational economics theory tries to explain and to solve different problems 
additional to simply risk sharing, emerging when banks decide on loans to borrowers on 
whom they possess imperfect information. Most of the researchers agree that monitoring of 
clients and foreseeing their potential is an intrinsically inherent role of financial 
intermediators33 and extension of loans if a most natural and efficient activity for a bank.34 A 
recent wave of investigation suggests that, with respect to new borrowers, banks may not 
have informational advantages, while they highly benefit and gain insider information on the 
stage of relationship lending.35 
The solutions and their practical applications in the developed financial markets are 
related to making optimal decisions on credit rationing (for example Besanko and Thakor 
(1987), Bester (1985), Jaffee and Russell (1976)), establishing the optimal size of collateral, 
choosing different screening devices to prevent moral hazard (Berger and Udell (1995), Best 
and Znang (1993)). However, collateral itself serves as a cause of moral hazard, e.g. with 
respect to the maintenance of the pledged assets.36  
Utilising data from developed economies, empirical research provides different 
support to hypothesis of the optimal monitoring techniques employed by banks. The results 
of Best and Znang (1993) suggest that a bank apply monitoring not equally to all borrowers 
and only after the initial screening. The bank has incentives to use costly financial evaluation 
                                                          
31 Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) identify also an importance of the lender’s rating. 
32 This is one of the possible informational problems that in the current context can  appear between creditors and 
borrowers. It becomes important when parties obtain information and make some decisions, i.e. investment choices, after 
the loan contract is sighed. 
33 Diamond (1984). 
34 Fama (1985), James (1987). 
35 Banks achieve informational advantages from long-term relationship with clients (Lummer and McConnell, 1989; 
Sharpe, 1990), especially in their broadened services to small business (Peek and Rosengren, 1998). 
36 Igawa and Kanatas (1990) show that in equilibrium their will be underinvestment in the maintenance of the pledged 
collateral with the requirement of higher expected collateral value in exchange for loans. High quality firms can obtain 
overcollaterised loans, while other choose between unsecured loans and self-financing. The former is preferred by the low 
quality ones.  
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only when it detects distorted signals about the borrowers’ behaviour. At the same time, it is 
not optimal to exercise further evaluation if positive indicators are observed. These 
conclusions support those of Lummer and McConnell (1989) and are to contrary to those of 
Boyd and Prescott (1986). The latter have concluded that it is optimal for a bank to apply 
screening only to those clients who provide positive information of their performance. At the 
same time, both approaches are questionable in the present conditions in Russia. 
Informational deficiencies and specific legal environment change assumptions, major 
influential factors and, consequently, relevant approaches to the problems. On the one hand, 
banks may try to employ quite thorough evaluation and monitoring of borrowers. But this 
will involve exceptionally high costs and monitoring can be even impossible due to the 
absence of such institution in the corporate credit market practice. The level of complexity 
and relative costs will depend on the status of borrower, degree of its credibility and quality 
of information provided. On the other hand, high risks and costs drive up the interest rate on 
loans far above the risk-free rate and reduce availability of funds for a group of less risky 
borrowers.  
Such problems stimulate moral hazard as asymmetric information may provide a 
possibility to extract additional private benefits. In this situation firms avoid to reveal it to 
many agents as informed parties can decrease their profitability.37 This situation is 
aggravated in the underdeveloped financial markets where we observe a lack of restrictions 
on the usage of insider information. 
Thus, further investigation relevant to the Russian specific conditions is needed to 
obtain optimal monitoring devices for different types of borrower. 
                                                          
37 Degryse and Ongena (2000). 
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4. Postulated problems specific to Russian credit 
market 
Informational and legal environment in Russia differs from countries with sound 
financial markets, informational transparency and efficient enforcement mechanisms. Then 
techniques employed by optimising agents as well as adjustment on their behaviour should 
be based on dissimilar approaches. Such environment for the interaction between a bank and 
a borrowing firm can be shown as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In the present situation of increasing credit activities of the Russian banks, lack of 
investment funds for the corporate sector can be related to two main issues: liquidity 
shortages of the banking industry due to problems with attracting resources to the banks, and 
high costs of loans for many small and medium-size firms. Here we approach the second 
financial issue using relevant game theoretic approach and providing possible policy 
recommendations. 
Default: min[K,L( (1+r)+C)]
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4.1 Collateral requirements 
 
In the first model of the thesis we will consider particular conditions of the Russian 
credit market that influence the determination of the interest rate on loans. Apart of the 
oligopolistic competition among financial intermediaries and available lending technology, 
interest rate may be affected by the uncertainty of loan repayment and following 
compensation from the collateral. In the case of borrower’s default the bank needs to 
undertake a complicated and costly procedure of claiming a compensation and realisation of 
the pledge.  
Avoiding consideration of exceptional cases, a standard Russian bank lends money 
only on the secured conditions, requiring either a reliable bail or adequate collateral. Since 
the third-party guarantee bears the same counteragent risks, it is adopted rather rarely38. 
Thus, collateral can serve as a common guarantee and usually covers the value of the loan 
with a huge margin, up to 200 per cent. It includes a principle with all interest payments and 
costs of extending and serving the debt. The latter factor can make a large contribution to its 
value due to a costly legal procedure of collateral realisation in the case of the borrower’s 
default. However, collateral does not fully insure the bank in case of the borrower’s default, 
as the value of the realised assets may be insufficient to cover due debt. Market risk is quite 
high in Russia (i.e. securities market may shrink even twofold, the real estate property may 
lose more than 50 percent of the market value, etc). Moreover, collateral value after the 
initiated bankruptcy procedure may be reduced due to claims of other creditors (i.e. creditors 
of the first and second order according to the Bankruptcy law in Russia).39  
The whole procedure of dealing with collateral is very cumbersome. High costs 
associated with the system of secure lending can be split into those, occurring before and 
during extension of the loan, and those, occurring in the case the borrower defaults. The 
former may include the process of evaluation, perseverance and guarantees of a safe pledge, 
while the latter are costs of the legal court procedure of claiming and further realisation of 
the pledged assets. Additional problems may arise if the firm management is shrewd enough 
to cheat, providing falsified collateral. It is extremely actual in nowadays Russia when 
                                                          
38 Besides the pure economic reasoning, banks often use so-called “window curtain”. The Central Bank of Russia applies 
the highest grade of risks to unsecured borrowers. Paradoxically, but banks consider such credits most secure as most of 
them are built on the relationship lending. Hence, not to worsen its reporting data, bank may adopt the guarantee from the 
company, which is more trustless, than the creditor himself.   
39 Creditors of the first order are citizens who have injury claims to the debtor. Wage arrears with respect to the working 
agreements and remuneration for the authors’ contracts are reimbursed in the second order. 
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lenders try to secure themselves with very high collateral requirements while borrowers are 
involved in different type of illegal operations (i.e. pledging the same of assets to different 
creditors, illegally registered securities or mortgages, etc). 
Collateral may have different valuations for the counteracting agents and may be not 
connected with the real value of the underlying asset. A bank’s evaluation is based on the 
market price of the pledged assets because the bank is concerned with obtaining a repayment 
from the collateral realisation after the firm’s default. The firm is usually not interested in 
realisation of its assets at the end of the loan agreement. So its valuation may be less 
connected to the real market value but rather to the firm specific value of the pledged asset. 
It can be higher or lower than the market value depending on how important are these 
particular assets to the firm. The value may be high if the assets are essential in the 
production, or the firm has made some specific investments in them. On the contrary, the 
firm may have a low valuation if it has a possibility to manipulate with these assets in a loan 
agreement. Nevertheless, the real value of the asset outside the credit relations cannot be 
lower for the firm because if the bank values it higher than the firm, latter may simply sell 
this asset to the bank with profit.  
Thus, it is interesting to focus on the case when collateral valuation is lower for the 
firm than to the bank due to the informational and legal environment imperfections. The 
firm may have a possibility to manipulate information about its property or hide some 
details about maintenance of the asset. This asset may be illegally pledged in the several 
loan agreements and the firm may provide a falsified documentation on it. Saying in another 
words, there can be some distortions in its value that will lead either to the lower market 
price at the end of the loan agreement or will affect only it worth to the firm. The former 
situation is less interesting as if the bank knows that the firm will cheat on it afterwards and 
the market price will fall, it can reasonably require higher collateral initially. However, this 
can lead to extremely high collateral constraint, which may be not possible in practice. At 
the same time, a possibility of pledging the same collateral in more than one credit contract 
erodes its value to the firm without influence on the price of the asset itself. These 
circumstances may result in a different perception of the collateral by the two players. In 
general all these present and expected expenses may play some role in the determination of 
the interest rate on loan. 
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4.2 Financial stability of borrowers 
 
Thus, enterprises’ demand for loans is pressed by the high interest rate, while most of 
them are unable to consider other sources of financing due either to their direct and indirect 
costs, or to underdeveloped mechanisms of issuing direct debt. However, general market 
conditions and specific factors associated with the collateral, discussed in the previous 
section, are not the only ones that play a role in the resulted cost of credit to the enterprises. 
Financial stability of the borrowers is essential for the credit relations and associated 
conditions of a loan contract, while collateral issue becomes important when the firm fails to 
repay the loan. The bank first of all tries to secure itself from the risk of the firm’s default 
and associated collateral realisation procedure, and therefore provides different contracts, at 
least in terms of the interest rate, to the more and less reliable borrowers.  
Almost all small firms in Russia are either operate in the underground economy or 
are widely engaged in the tax evasion, maintain wage arrears and other non-payments, 
including debt to creditors and suppliers, etc. The main peculiarity is that they are used not 
only by inefficient and close-to-bankruptcy firms, but also by quite well operating and really 
profitable ones. Low contract enforcement and possibilities to “interpret the law in ones own 
favour” create a situation when firms can benefit from underground activities. However, 
banks probably have more effective enforcement possibilities to ensure repayment than other 
market agents or tax authorities. 
Apart from the negative effects on the federal and local budgets, another drawback is 
that these operations influence financial documents of the firm and worsens a formal picture 
of its well-being. Due to tax evasion financial documentation underestimates the true values 
of their assets, turnover, and obtained profit, which ideally serve for a bank as a formal basis 
for the involvement in the credit relations with a firm. If the firm persistently shows low or 
zero profit (even though the real reason is tax evasion) and large indebtedness (even though 
it is able to pay its creditors) this inevitably will influence a bank’s decision to extend credit 
to this firm. 
If the whole financial picture is not very bad and the firm is able to provide liquid 
collateral and adequate economic justification for its credit needs, the bank will extend a 
loan. However, the conditions of the loan contract can be quite unfavourable for the firm, for 
example, interest rate level, type of repayment schedule, type and size of collateral, etc. At 
least a bank may require rather high interest payments on its loans due to the high 
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probability of the firms’ default. If a firm is not credible according to its financial 
documents, a bank will not be interested in attracting it as a potential client but to the 
contrary will try to insure itself and will spend more effort on checking documentation and 
evaluating its performance. The costs of this effort and the remaining possibility of the 
firm’s default will then be reflected in the higher interest rate on the loan. 
Banks in Russia are information-constrained due to the underdeveloped techniques of 
information gathering, utilisation and communication in the market. In the absence of 
standardised accounting documentation, absence of such institutions as credit history, rating 
agencies, recognised auditing standards,40 etc some activities like promotion of reputation41 
or signalling devices, can be employed by market agents in their interrelations to reduce 
informational distortions. In the chapter 6 we will consider the latter mechanism as a 
possibility to improve and stabilise borrow-lender relationship. Now we will turn to the 
analysis of the Russian environment specific factors influencing the determination of the 
interest rate on loans.   
 
                                                          
40 Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) conducted en empirical analysis of how legal and accounting systems explain 
differences in the level of financial development. Their results suggest that provision of contract enforcement and creditor 
rights, legal and accounting reforms can enhance both economic growth and better developed financial intermediation. 
41 Reputation as a self-enforcement mechanism to the credit market was introduced by Wood (1975), and  Shapiro (1983) 
studied the effects of reputation on the equilibrium price and quality in product markets. 
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5. Banks’ decisions on the loan market 
5.1 Description of the model 
 
First, we illustrate a lender-borrower relationship as a static two-stage game with 
imperfect information of banks about the firms’ choice of technology. Banks act in the credit 
market as competing oligopolies42 and determine the amount of loans provided to the 
firms.43 Homogeneous firms are engaged in production using credit resources supplied by 
the banks in return for a certain collateral. A representative firm’s choice of technology 
depends on the prevailing market interest rate on loans and on the worth of the pledged 
assets for this particular firm. We restrict our attention to the credit market, given risk-free 
interest rate, and assume that the bank bears certain costs of dealing with the collateral in 
case of borrowers default.44 
Agents are risk neutral expected utility maximisers, which is easier justified for the 
banks as they diversify risks and allocate their resources in several available market assets.45  
5.1.1 Firm’s problem 
Expected profit of a representative firm depends on its choice of technology reflected 
in a value of project return (Y). Amount of obtained loans, used in production, is normalised 
to one. 
Consider for simplicity two types of technologies available in the market: a modest 
good technology can bring a certain return of YS , while a risky technology provides Y and 
Y  with corresponding probabilities p and (1-p) with YYrY S <<<  and 
YpYpYEYS )1()( −+=> . So in case of risky technology the firm is able to repay a loan 
only if the good state occurs with probability p. These assumptions on the returns from two 
available technologies generate a moral hazard problem for a firm. 
                                                          
42 According to the number of functioning banks in Russia, oligopolistic competition is a more justifiable and adequate 
form of market interactions than a monopoly or perfect competition. 
43 Starting from the contribution of Sealey, James and Lindley (1977) behaviour of the financial institutions is analysed not 
only from the point of view of the portfolio theory but also using a production and cost theory. The authors suggest a model 
where they consider a financial institution as a profit maximising producer. 
44 Other possible costs (i.e. general costs of lending and attraction of deposits) are assumed to be zero.  
45 It can also be explained by their possibility to buy market portfolio of securities. 
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 If the firm would be able to finance the project independently of the bank, its choice 
of technology would be different, as it would just maximise expected return and finance all 
positive net present value projects. In a simple case with borrowing, the firm is concerned 
only about the upper part of the distribution of risky returns, when it obtains a positive profit 
and thus the more it can get, even at the expense of a high risk, the better. However, with 
collateral requirements that formally cover a total size of the loan, the firm will not 
jeopardise its pledged assets but only if it really value them at least as much as the bank. In 
the current case, an important role is played by the assumption that valuation of the 
collateral may be different for the firm and the bank. Banks’ requirements for the collateral 
are given as L((1+r)+C) and bank’s appraisal of the collateral is based on its expected 
market value. If the firm assess its pledged assets according to their real value, it will try to 
avoid defaults and will prefer a stable technology.  But if the collateral is almost worthless 
for the firm we will be back to the simple case of borrowing with default liability limited 
only to the obtained return.  
In the first case, collateral valuation does not create any specific problems and even 
stimulate a choice of superior technology. The second case is more interesting and we will 
use in our analysis some factors that reflect a level of informational transparency, legal 
enforcement and tightness of the institutional constrains in the society. In a prudent society 
with a high enforcement level there is less possible for the firms to manipulate information, 
use falsified documentation and provide an illegal pledge. Let the firm’s valuation of 
collateral be expressed as v = γZi, where Zi is the amount of the collateral required by the 
bank and γ is a parameter reflecting decreased collateral value for the firm due to the illegal 
manipulations with the pledged assets )10( ≤≤ γ . Then, γ can represent, for example, a state 
of the legal enforcement with a high level when γ→1 and a low level when γ→0. 
We assume that the bank has informational advantage to check a status of the 
collateral provided by the firm (i.e. property rights, registration of the pledge, etc). So the 
firm cannot cheat on the bank, and the latter can always legally claim compensation from the 
pledged assets if the firm defaults on a loan. However, due to the above-mentioned factors 
the firm has a possibility to pledge illegally the same assets to another market agent, with 
less informational power than the bank. Then, it will put a very low value on this collateral 
in a given loan agreement with a bank. Nevertheless, the bank will still have a legal 
advantage in this case, as it is highly probable that the first pledge will be officially 
authorised by the court, and the bank will receive a loan repayment from the sold asset.  
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5.1.2 Bank’s problem 
There are N banks in the market and Li  is the amount of lending chosen by bank i, 
i=1…N. Uncertainty in the credit operations is related to the possibility of borrower’s 
default, expected by the bank with probability (1-q), which depends on the firm’s choice of 
technology and a corresponding probability that obtained return will be insufficient to cover 
the debt. Then the bank will be confronted with a necessity to undertake a formal legal 
procedure of claiming compensation from the pledged assets and will incur all associated 
costs. These costs can include negotiations with the firm’s management, costs of the court 
procedure and organisation of the assets sale, possibly in the form of an auction.  
Formally, in the case of borrower’s default the bank should obtain a full 
compensation from the collateral, as it was discussed in the previous chapter the loan 
agreement requires a collateral that totally covers the debt. This means that the firm pays 
(1+r)Li  from its profit or ((1+r)+C)Li  from the pledged assets. However, due to the 
uncertainty associated with the future value of the pledged assets and inefficient legal 
procedure, future collateral value may be insufficient to cover due debt to the bank. K~  is a 
random collateral value with a probability distribution f(K) perceived by the banks when 
they decide their lending policy. On the one hand, the price of an asset may change during 
the period of a loan contract and, for example, drop just before the time when it should be 
realised by the court order. On the other hand, the firm may have a lot of claims from the 
creditors of the first and second order, while the bank, as a secured creditor, has a right only 
for compensation in the third order. This specific feature of the current Russian legislation 
may lead to the situation when the bank is left only with a partial compensation if the firm 
does not have enough assets to satisfy all claims of its creditors of a higher order.  
For a more clear representation, uncertainty created for banks by a firm’s default can 
be expressed by some stochastic parameter ξ (i.e. variance in the collateral price and/or 
indebtedness of the insolvent firm and demands of its creditors of the order higher than the 
bank). Then repayment to the bank in the case of the firm’s default is expressed as 
{ }))(1(,~min),( CLrLKErE i ++=Ω ξ . It obtains a full repayment ))(1( CLrLi ++  only if 
collateral value is sufficient to cover the debt including associated costs, otherwise it obtains 
some value K. 
 
 
 Expected repayment EΩ 
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The cost function CLi is linear in the amount of loan, and we focus only on the costs 
incurred by the bank in the case of the firm’s default on the loan. Opportunity costs of funds 
are represented by possible investments under the risk-free rate g. 
5.2 Equilibrium conditions 
 
We solve the game using backward induction. Knowing a reaction function of the 
other player, namely the firm, the banks choose amount of loans and thus implicitly 
determine a prevailing interest rate r, and ask for corresponding collateral. The firm 
optimises its choice of technology, given r and its own collateral valuation v. A solution of 
the joint problem will lead to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. So we start 
from the consideration of the firm’s problem and its optimal choice of technology. 
5.2.1 Optimal conditions for the firm’s problem 
For the choice of the stable technology the following condition on the firm’s 
expected profit must be satisfied: 
( ) ( ) ( )ν−+−+−≥− 1)1( YprYprYS  
Then the value, below which the firm’s optimal technological choice will coincide 
with a stable technology, is: 
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This expression shows that firm’s collateral valuation should not be very low 
compared with a required gross repayment on loans. For sufficiently low values of v such 
divergence will exceed the difference between expected returns from the two projects 
corrected on the probability of the default. It also provides a range of possible collateral 
values for the firm that for a given interest rate on loans make the firm to choose stable 
technology. The lower bound on it can be rewritten as: 
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So the critical level for the firm’s collateral valuation is then given by: 
Yr ~)1(ˆ −+≡ν  
Remember the expression for the firm’s collateral valuation iZγν = . Then the bank 
can be sure about the purpose of its loan and the firm will invest in a secure technology if the 
level of the legal enforcement is high enough to prevent manipulation with the collateral and 
following low valuation of it by the firm. The critical level γˆ is given by: 
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The critical level depends on the interest rate on loan, and when the higher is in 
general the latter the more legal enforcement is necessary in order to prevent weak 
investments. Hence, the probability of repayment to the bank, which is lower in the case of 
risky technology, is affected by the collateral valuation through this parameter γ. When 
γγ ˆ< , the valuation is νν ˆ< , and the repayment on the loan will be uncertain and will 
happen only with a probability p:  
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Thus, from the bank point of view, the repayment on loans depends on these 
probabilities and they take them into account when considering expected profit from the 
credit operations.  
However, as γ depends on r, it is reasonable to invert this expression and take into 
account also a bound on the interest rate:  
RYcr ˆ
1
)~1()1( =−
−−+< γ
γ                                                                               (1) 
Under the certain value of the model parameters γ , c, p, Y , the interest rate found 
from the banks optimality conditions can be below the bound Rˆ . Then under such a 
contract, the firms will efficiently implement a stable technology. However, it can be 
optimal for the banks to set a higher interest rate (as under certain parameters Rˆ  can be very 
low or even negative), which will take into the account risk of the firm’s default. So the 
higher is a comparative expected return from the stable technology and the higher is the 
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level of legal enforcement γ , so that the firm has less possibilities to manipulate with the 
collateral, the higher the chance that the firm will implement a stable technology. 
5.2.2 Optimal conditions for the banks’ problem 
The total demand for loans is given by L(r). Each bank maximises its expected profit 
with respect to the amount of loans extended, Li, given the inverse demand r(L), ( 0<dL
dr ) 
and the optimal choices of other banks   Lj , ij ≠ . If we consider a special case of only two 
strategically interacting banks, each of them will optimise knowing the downward sloping 
response function, L2(L1) and L1(L2), and a negative effect of the decision of the other on the 
profit and marginal profit of the former. Assuming equal cost functions, banks are equally 
aggressive in the market and a symmetric Cournot equilibrium occurs at the intersection of 
their reaction functions. 
In a general situation with several banks, a vector Li, i=1…N maximises their 
expected profit, and banks equally divide the market with each setting Li*=L*/N. In the 
equilibrium the total demand for loans is equal to the total supply at a given interest rate r*. 
Then expected profit of the i-th bank can be written in the following form: 
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Before we derive the F.O.C. for the profit maximisation, let consider expected value 
of the repayment in the case of default, assuming a continuous distribution of the collateral 
value: 
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We will first differentiate this expected default repayment with respect to the amount 
of loan Li: 
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Then we can implicitly obtain amount of loans for bank i: 
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Adapting the standard approach for oligopolistic model to a particular uncertainty 
case, this condition can be rewritten in a profit margin form using the elasticity of the 
demand for loans 0)( >∂
∂−=
L
r
r
Lrε  
Then, (2) will be given by: 
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This expression provides a connection between the market power of the bank and its 
profit margin on the credit markets.46 It is possible to consider it as an implicit determination 
of the optimal interest rate r* set by the banks on the credit market. 
5.3 Model results for the interest rate policy and 
implications of the asymmetric collateral value 
 
Intermediation margin is a value obtained by the oligopolistic banks in addition to 
the simple coverage of their risk and costs of the credit. Uncertainty influences the result 
with a probability that the firm fails on its loan repayment, so the remaining part is due to the 
probability of obtaining a compensation either from the firm or from the realised collateral: 
1)Pr()1( ≤≥−+ iZKqq . The costs, incurred in our model in the case of the firm default, 
also require a higher interest rate in order to preserve a margin. Hence, the interest rate is 
affected by the possible default on the loan (risk component), expected costs and risk-free 
rate. The first two effects alter this case form the standard one. Higher risk-free return 
required on the market also induces higher interest rates on loans as 0>∂
∂ ∗
g
r . Negative 
effect of this was clearly seen before the crises of August 1998, when soaring profits 
obtained through operations with government treasury bills influenced market interest rates. 
However, in the present conditions when banks are not engage in speculative operations with 
                                                          
46 Equation is based on the Lerner index. 
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government debt and have less possibilities of asset allocation apart of lending, interest rates 
on loans become more accessible for borrowers. 
However, we need to check the condition (1) on the interest rate obtained from (2), 
as it may be profitable for the bank to decrease it in order to stimulate the firm to choose a 
stable technology. If (1) is not fulfilled (i.e. r*> Rˆ ), then market conditions are such that an 
interest rate, under which a stable technology is preferred, is too low to be possible. Firm’s 
collateral valuation is quite low, and it is optimal to invest in a risky technology, which 
provides a possibility of the loan repayment only in a case of success with a probability p.  
So the bank optimally insures itself from the risky investment with a high interest rate, and 
the firm’s optimal investment is inefficient. 
However, under sufficiently high γ and Y~ , we can obtain an efficient case, when the 
firms invest in a stable technology, and the banks obtain a profit with certainty. Then the 
amount of loans and a corresponding interest rate will be as follows: 
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A simple case of constant elasticity will lead to: 
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Given comparative returns on a stable and risky technologies, we can influence the 
size of the parameter γ by improving the legal enforcement in the society and reducing the 
possibility to manipulate with the pledged property. This will lead to the higher critical level 
for which a stable technology will prevail in the market. At the same time, decreased risk of 
the stable investments makes the banks optimal choices of the interest rate lower, given a 
certain risk-free rate. 
However, when the latter case prevails and the firms invest efficiently in the stable 
technologies, collateral itself may be a source of distortions. Some inefficiency from the 
social point of view may arise in the case when the firm values its collateral sufficiently high 
( νν ˆ≥ ) and its valuation is even higher than the one used by the bank. It may be the case 
when the firm has too few assets and they are very valuable for its production technology, 
need to pledge some materials and divert them from the production process for a period of a 
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loan, or has made some specific investments into the asset or into the technology related to 
this particular asset, which it needs to pledge. Then it may value collateral much higher than 
the market price is (i.e. v>K, where δ is a discrepancy between the valuation of the firm and 
the bank, δ=v-K).  
The problem may appear in a more general model, when a stable technology has 
some probability of success ps and default (1-ps), with   
rrrrssss YpYpYpYp )1()1( −+>−+  and rs YY > . Then the firm cannot repay the loan 
with a probability (1-ps) and loses its collateral. Such situation can arise also when the firm 
can be bankrupted by some of its other creditors than bank (the latter will not have a reason 
to do it if the firm repays its loans). In its production process the firm usually have many 
relations with other creditors besides the bank. And given a high level of non-payments in 
the economy even for the stable firms, such a bankruptcy can be quite probable. This will 
have clear consequences for the social costs and benefits.  
A good case when the firm totally repays its obligations obviously results in a 
positive increment to total surplus, where L – amount of the loan extended, r – interest rate 
on loans, r+d – return on investment for the firm.  
 
Table 3.  Costs and benefits for the agents in the case of repayment of loans  
Repayment For the bank For the firm Total 
Credit -L L 0 
Return on credit (1+r)L (1+r+d)L-(1+r)L (1+r)L+dL>0 
Profit rL dL RL+dL>0 
 
Obviously, the case of default/bankruptcy has negative consequences on the social 
surplus. If the firm is not able to repay its loan it loses at least collateral,47 but probably also 
other assets and returns in the bankruptcy, if other creditors have claims against the firm. 
Moreover, the disparity in the perception of the collateral value for the firm and the bank 
adds its negative impact of size δ along with the cost of bankruptcy. 
 
Table 4.  Costs and benefits for the agents in the case of bankruptcy or a default on 
loans 
Case of For the bank For the firm Total 
                                                          
47 The pledged assets are sold after the court procedure, which is initiated because of the firm’s default.  
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default 
K>(1+r)L+
c 
K<(1+r)L+c K>(1+r)L+c K<(1+r)L+c K>(1+r)L+c K<(1+r)L+c Credit 
-L-c L -c 
Revenue (1+r)L+c K -V+(K-
L(1+r)-c) 
-V -δ<0 -δ<0 
Profit rL K-L-c L-V+(K-
L(1+r)-c) 
L-V -δ-c<0 -δ-c<0 
 
The discrepancy in the collateral valuation increases the costs for the society of such 
bankruptcy because firm’s assets are realised according to the market valuation, while they 
cost much more for the firm.48 It is interesting to note that the market price of the asset 
realisation does not play any role from the social point of view. Even when it is quite high so 
that the bank does not lose but has a positive profit, the social loss is as high as in the lower 
market price case.  
                                                          
48 Extending the analysis for the third group, i.e. small creditors who may initiate the bankruptcy, will not change the result. 
Then in addition to the bank loan, the firm obtains from them some payments of a size S. While in the bankruptcy they 
receive firm’s cash flows Y and all that is left from the collateral realization K-L(1+r)-c, in order to compensate for 
provided S.  As before all values cancelled and the total surplus -δ-c obtains, no matter the market value of the collateral. 
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6. Modelling of the interaction of a bank and a firm 
in a loan contract 
 
After the consideration of the specific factors influencing the interest rate on loans, 
let us turn now to a more detailed analysis of the interactions between a representative bank 
and two types of borrowers. In what follows, we will concentrate less on the case of the 
firms’ default but more on the difference in the firms’ ability to repay the loans. In order to 
get an explicit solution in a convenient form and compare different situations resulting from 
the solutions of a game, let us simplify further and assume a perfect-competition 
environment. A representative bank’s choice of the interest rate depends on the risk of a 
particular borrower or of a pool of borrowers if the bank cannot distinguish them. We 
continue to use a two-stage game-theoretic setup with information asymmetry between the 
parties. The focus of the model is again maid on the conflict of interest between the firms’ 
owners and outside investors, with the insiders possessing private information about the 
firms’ internal possibilities. A signalling model is used to present some suggestions for the 
improvement of the bank-borrower relationship, in particular with respect to the possibility 
to obtain lower repayment on credit for the more reliable group of borrowers. 
6.1 Agents choices and key features of the model 
 
All banks are identical and a representative risk neutral bank makes its decision 
about the rate of return on its loans to the firms depending on what it observes in the market, 
i.e. a risk-free market interest rate ( g ) and business prospects of the firms formalised in the 
expected rates of return on their investments. The firms are identical in all respects except 
their type (high quality or low quality, expressed in the level if riskiness of their activities), 
which is their private information. It is possible to consider that all firms are investing in the 
same project (i.e. each firm is the same project from the bank’s point of view) but have 
different firm-specific investment risks. Such investment possibilities are expressed in terms 
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of the firm’s cash flows with an equal mean for both types and a lower variance for the high 
type.49  All firms are rational expected utility maximisers. 
Firms need to finance their investments and the only possibility available to them 
possibility is to obtain a loan from the bank with a requirement to repay with a rate of return    
( r ), specified by the bank.50 I assume that neither external financing opportunities like using 
direct debt or equity, nor internal as retained profit are available to them. The former is 
because I consider only small and medium size firms, some of them are also only at the 
initial stage of their activities, which makes it difficult to attract external funds in terms of 
both costs and revenues, especially when financial markets are not very developed. The 
latter is due to the fact that firms hide profit for tax purposes and thus, even efficient ones, 
usually do not have a possibility to retain it for investment purposes. I assume here that all 
firms utilise possibilities arising from legislation inefficiencies and generally low contract 
enforcement between most of agents in the economy. By tax evasion and tax arrears, 
postponing payments including debt to suppliers and other trade creditors,51 and other 
arrears, firms obtain some amount N of illegal sources. These operations are reflected in the 
firms’ financial statements,52 so the bank cannot make a distinction between them according 
to these criteria, assuming bank employees cannot participate in the firm’s activities and are 
not aware personally of the true state of the firm’s finance. However, these illegal sources of 
funds are limited and, which is more important, these funds cannot be used as legal 
investments.53 So it cannot be considered as a part of possible financing, and the firm 
inevitably has to ask for credit in order to exploit available investment opportunities. 
Distribution of returns depends on such factors as business environment, style of 
management or technological capabilities because firms bear different risk in their activity 
while dealing with partners, deciding on the risky market strategies and executing their 
projects, etc. But they may also differ in their ability to bribe tax inspectors, to renegotiate 
debts with creditors and suppliers, and to settle down different conflicts with other market 
agents, which is reflected in the costs aimed on these purposes. Let kH and kL be an “informal 
                                                          
49 As it was shown by Giammarino and Neave (1982), in such a case the pecking order hypothesis will result in firms 
issuing only equity. However, in our model, the opportunity for firms to issue equity is not considered among the available 
financing choices and the standard pecking order doesn’t work. 
50 Let g be a gross interest rates. 
51 A benefit from having overdue debt to trade creditors can be calculated as Q ?g/(1+g), where  Q is a size of the debt and 
g a discount rate. 
52 It’s know that most firms in Russia use double accounts and thus, they can have internal financial records reflecting their 
true state of finance (i.e. the level of profit). It may be argued that they can submit them to the bank, however, we will 
assume that bank’s financial analysts take into account only official documentation, verifies by the tax authorities and 
external auditors. 
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costs” for the H- and L-type firms respectively, where 0<kL< kH <154. It is natural to assume 
that it is easier to utilise illegal funds for the high-risk firm, while H-type firm waste more 
resources on such “informal costs”. 
The credit management department of the bank evaluates firms’ performance 
according to observable factors and using credit management theory. First, the bank 
abolishes apparently inefficient firms and then considers a provision of loans to the rest of 
the borrowers who satisfy some necessary criteria (i.e. justified purpose of loan, agreement 
on the collateral and repayment schedule, good credit history, if available, etc). We assume 
that the firms are similar in these terms and have the same purpose and length of the loan 
with a possible repayment after the investment return is realised. From now on we will 
restrict our attention to these particularly chosen firms. The analysis of the firms’ investment 
opportunities provides the bank with an adequate picture of the firms’ distribution of risk 
and return, but it cannot identify which group of firms has higher variance of returns that the 
other. Consequently, the bank’s decision behaviour will be based on its judgement about the 
share of each group in the considered economy, narrowed in the above-mentioned sense. 
The bank offers to the firm a contract (1, r) where the amount of the loan and thus of 
the financing required by the firm amounts to one. We continue to assume here that the firm 
wishes to finance all positive NPV investments available, hence firms will turn to the bank 
only if the outside market option g is not too high compared with their expected rate of 
return from internal investments. The bank in its turn has enough resources to provide but 
will do it only in return for the adjusted to the risk a repayment rate r. The borrowers accept 
the rate r as long as it allows them to obtain a positive gain from investment. This is always 
the case unless r is too high to exceed the maximum investment return, and so the market 
clears. 
The main model assumptions are summarised as followers: 
There is no conflict of interest between managers and owners55, both within the firm 
and within the bank;  
Firms obtain financing only through bank loans and direct it only to their investment 
opportunities (i.e. no private benefit from it is possible); 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
53 One of the possible explanations can be that they are in the form of “black cash”. 
54 It is possible to assume firm’s informal costs to be related to its variance by the inverse exponential function: 
22
 k,  k LH LH ee
σσ −− == , which will provide a required relation between the cost of H- and L-type firms. 
55 This is quite relevant for the small and medium size firms and even can be assumed that the firms are managed by their 
owners. 
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There is no moral hazard problem neither from the bank’s nor from the firm’s side. It 
is not possible to bribe bank managers in order to avoid repayment on the loan, and the firm 
considers the bank the senior creditor;56 
All firms evade taxes, and this cannot be efficiently prevented by supervision and 
legislation;  
Officially certified financial documents submitted to the bank serve as a source for 
the borrower evaluation. 
For simplicity, we assume limited liability of the firm and do not consider any 
significant collateral value that can be realised in the case of default.  
According to the priority rules of the Russian bankruptcy legislation the amount of 
the legal claims on the firm’s assets with higher priority than the bank’s one can be quite 
high. While, I assume that exactly in the case when realised investment returns are lower 
than the repayment, the creditors set up all their claims against the firm and turn it bankrupt.  
So when the high priority claims exceed the firm liquidation value57, the bank can be left 
with nothing, which justifies the last assumption about insignificant realised collateral value 
in the case of bankruptcy. So we assume that in the case of default a collateral can cover 
only incurred costs but repayment on loan is zero.  
We continue to assume a discrete distribution of the firm’s cash flow, where                
( XSH , XdH ) and ( XSL , XdL ) are the corresponding successful and downward investment 
returns for the H-high type and L-low type firms. These returns have the property that XdL < 
XdH < XSH < XSH and are verifiable by outsiders. Realisations of X have corresponding 
probabilities ( pSH , pdH ) and ( pSL , pdL ) with pSH + pdH =1 and pSL + pdL = 1. These 
distributions of returns have the following properties: 
the mean is equal for both types:  
E(X) = pSLXSL+(1-pSL)Xd L= pSHXSH+(1-pSH)XdH, and is a common knowledge; 
the variance is asymmetric information and is higher for the lower type, which thus 
bears higher risk in its activities:  
σ 2H = pSH(XSH-E(X))2 +(1-pSH) (XdH-E(X))2  < pSL (XSL-E(X))2 +(1-pSL )(XdL-E(X))2= 
σ 2L .  
                                                          
56 This means that if the firm is performing good anmail_old can repay its debts, it will always repay the bank loan, while it 
can extensively delay payments to other creditors. The firm fails to repay the loan only in the case of insolvency, which in 
the context of our model means that the firm has obtained a return on investment less than the required repayment to the 
bank. 
57 Not to mention a possibility that the firm possibly has provided a damaged or already pledged assets as a collateral, 
which also diminishes the realized collateral value. 
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The distributions of firms’ returns, or in other words, the two ways of conducting 
business activities corresponding to the two types of firms, is a common knowledge, but the 
bank cannot distinguish between these two types. The only thing that distinguishes them is 
the variance of the returns, which is private information. So the bank cannot distinguish the 
firms’ type but it assigns a probability λ of the firm being of type H and 1-λ of type L, which 
is a common knowledge in the economy according to the relative possible shares of firms 
with each type of riskiness. 
6.2 The model and equilibrium conditions 
 
The bank observes the firms’ actions and makes its choice about the interest rate on 
loans, taking into account its believes about the firm being of some type and relative 
probabilities of the loan repayment. The probability that the bank will receive its money 
back (i.e. the ability of the firm to pay its bill to the bank) is connected to the distribution of 
investment returns. The bank is concerned only about the upper part of the realised 
distribution, which exceeds the amount of the due debt, when the probability that the rate of 
return on firm’s investment is higher than the required gross repayment rate set by the bank; 
as otherwise the firm gets bankrupt and the bank obtains nothing. In this competitive 
economy the size of the interest on loans will be set as a risk adjustment to the observed risk-
free rate, assuming for simplicity zero costs of asset-liabilities management (i.e. loans 
extension and deposits attraction). 
Let us consider cases depending on whether the firms’ types are known to the bank 
or not, and how the latter situation can be improved.  
 
Firm’s type is a common knowledge 
First, suppose that the types of the firms are known and thus the bank can infer 
probabilities of successful repayment or default. Probabilities of repayment from the lender 
point of view depend on the interest rate on loan, which it sets. Market competition leads to 
the following condition for interest rates that maximise bank expected profit for the 
respective H- and L-type of firms: 
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where pH and pL are corresponding probabilities of the debt repayment by the firms, 
i.e. probability that realised investment return is higher than required repayment rate on loan 
rH and rL. Thus, depending on the level of the interest risk-free rate g the bank will choose an 
interest rate on loan, which will affect the probability of repayment. According to the 
distribution of the firms’ returns there are five possible intervals for r, which lead to different 
repayment probabilities:  
r < XdL             ⇒    pH = pL = 1                   g < XdL 
XdL < r < XdH    ⇒    pH = 1, pL = pSL    XdL < g < piXdH 
XdH < r < XSH   ⇒  pH = pSH , pL = pSL , which is valid when   piXdH < g < piXSH ,   i=H,L 
XSH < r < XSL  ⇒    pH = 0, pL = pSL    piXSH < g < piXSL 
XSL < r            ⇒    pH = 0, pL = 0    piXSL < g 
It is clear that the first and the last interval eliminate all uncertainty and will be 
irrelevant afterwards for the private information case. For the first interval the bank’s choice 
of r = g does not depend on the type, while the last interval eliminates any choices as neither 
the bank will credit nor the firm will ask for a loan on the conditions that lead to a certain 
bankruptcy. Initially, which interval r falls in depends on the rate g. And excluding extreme 
cases it is natural to assume that market risk-free rate is higher than the lowest possible 
return and is lower than the highest possible investment return. Hence from now and on we 
will concentrate attention on three interim intervals. 
It is easy to see that in the fourth interval is valid, the H-type firm will not receive 
any financing. But in the second interval, it obtains a lower rate on loans, i.e. r = g, than the 
L-type firm. H-type firms cannot borrow in the fourth interval, as, due to level of the 
prevailing risk-free market rate, the return required by the bank is so high that it can attract 
only very risky borrowers. Relative size of the interest rate in the third interval will depend 
on the ratio pSH / pSL . So if we assume pSH > pSL and thus, always higher probability of 
repayment for the H-type, the interest rate on loan will be decreasing in the firms’ type.  
Consequently, in the case of observable information, H-type firms can enjoy 
borrowing on better terms as the bank sets a higher interest rate to the riskier firms of type L.  
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These results are quite natural for the credit market when banks can provide more favourable 
conditions for more reliable firms. At the same time, banks compensate themselves with a 
higher interest rate required from firms which returns are more uncertain.  
 
Firm’s type is private information 
As it was already mentioned above the bank actually cannot distinguish between 
firms’ types, as all considered firms independent on their efficiency avoid taxes and 
postpone payments, which negatively influence their financial statements and distort the real 
picture of their operations. Bank’s choice of the interest rate is guided by its beliefs - 
probability with which it can observe each firms’ type. Then the bank revises its beliefs 
depending on the observed firms decisions about getting financing from the bank so that the 
banks actions and its beliefs are consistent with the firms actions. 
Thus, in the case of asymmetric information the bank will choose a common rate r 
for both types of firms according to the following:    
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Here we should further take into consideration all three mentioned above as relevant 
for the problem intervals for the interest rate on loans and different possible types of banks 
beliefs. 
 
Pooling beliefs:  
We will consider possible choices of interest rate when the bank assigns a probability 
λ that it is a H-type firm that borrows, and a probability 1-λ that it is a L-type firm.   
1. In case XdL < r < XdH , with the rate 
L
Sp
gr
)1( λλ −+=  set by the bank if the 
risk-free market return is observed on the level XdL < g < XdH [λ+(1-λ)pSL] , H-type firms 
repay with certainty and L-type with a probability pSL.  
Then H-type expected profit is: ))(1()()1( rXprXpkN HdHSHSHSH −−+−+−  
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L-type expected profit is58 : )()1( rXpkN LSLSL −+− . 
2. In case XdH < r < XSH , with the rate 
L
S
H
S pp
gr
)1( λλ −+=  set by the bank if 
the risk-free market return is observed on the level XdH [λ+(1-λ)pSL]  < g < XdH [λ pSH +(1-
λ)pSL] , H-type firms repay with a probability pSH and L-type with the same probability pSL.  
Then H-type receives )()1( rXpkN HSHSH −+− and the form of expected profit of the         
L-type firm is the same as in the previous case. 
3. In the last considered case when XSH <r < XSL , with the rate 
L
Sp
gr =  set by the 
bank if the risk-free market return is observed on the level XdH [λ pSH +(1-λ)pSL] < g < XSL 
pSL   H-type firms cannot repay any loan while L-type repays with the same probability.  
Then H-type does not obtain a loan and receives only )1( HkN − , while the form of type-L 
expected profit is maintained unchanged. 
It follows that L-type firms will always apply for a loan and invest, disregarding the 
interest rate level, as it always obtains a positive expected profit from such investments due 
to the upper part of its returns distribution. H-type firms, on the other hand, refrain from 
investing in the latter case with a high required rate of return on bank loan relatively to its 
investment returns. Hence, we obtain a pooling equilibrium in all cases except the last one, 
when XSH <r < XSL.   
 
Separating beliefs: 
When the bank separates firms it is necessary to consider the situation when it 
assigns beliefs λ=0 to the H-type firm, which never borrows, and believes 1-λ = 1 to the L-
type firm, who are the only possible borrows.  The opposite situation is never possible as L-
type firms always borrows and invest. Then the first two intervals are not relevant as H-type 
has relatively high investment returns and will borrow, which is inconsistent with the initial 
separating beliefs of the bank. Thus, we will check the later case, when XSH <r < XSL , with 
the rate 
L
Sp
gr =  set by the bank if the risk-free market return is observed on the level XSH 
pSL < g < XSL pSL . As before H-type firms cannot repay any loan with such an interest rate 
and will not borrow. Thus, on this interval banks beliefs are supported by the firms’ actions 
                                                          
58 When the firm fails to repay its loan obligations and goes bankrupt its returns equal zero as all formal assets are 
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and a separating equilibrium obtains with H-type left with only )1( HkN − and L-type 
receiving: )()1( rXpkN LSLSL −+− . 
Consequently, taking into account all possible ranges for the interest rate, we obtain a 
pooling in the first two cases and a separating equilibrium in the third case. The latter is 
characterised by the underinvestment from the H-type firms and worsening of the quality of 
the firms, which borrow from the bank. 
6.3 Signalling possibilities of the firms 
 
All firms get some utility from the illegal funds and it is costly for them to cancel 
“cheap” resources. However, they cannot finance investments with these funds and need to 
borrow under the interest rate r. At the same time, the firms are indistinguishable for the 
bank and this influence obtained by them interest on loans. Thus, H-type firms have either to 
mix up with the L-type and to repay loans with a high interest due to the high uncertainty of 
the lender, or try to signal their quality and less risky performance. In order to provide an 
adequate signal to the bank H-type firms should undertake an action that cannot be imitated 
by the L-type firms. By refraining from the illegal sources of money firms can prove their 
belonging to the high type by the quality of their financial records, which not always can be 
copied by the low-type firms. If such signal is credible it is rewarding, since the bank will 
then distinguish the H-type from the total pool by its signal. It will adjust its beliefs 
accordingly and set an interest rate specifically to each type of firms according to the case 
when types were fully observable.  Thus, H-type will gain in the possibility to obtain 
cheaper bank loans. However, the signal will be credible if it is really valuable for the H-
firms to send it and it is not worthwhile for the L-type to imitate it. Thus, to prove existence 
of a signalling equilibrium we need to show that cutting off N is profitable for the H-firm in 
return for the corresponding to its type interest rate on loans, and cannot be mimicked by the 
L-firms at least for some values of illegal funds, and some or all ranges of interest rate r.  
We need to check the following conditions: EUHsignal ≥ EUH and EULsignal ≤ EUL. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
liquidated, but the amount of illegal benefits N(1-k) is saved. 
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1. Case XdL < r < XdH , with a rate gr signal =  when the lender recognises a signal 
from the H-type firms and reviews his believes setting λ=1 and (1-λ)=0, and a 
S
Lp
gr
)1( λλ −+=  otherwise. 
It is profitable for the H-type firms to signal if: 




−+−−+
+



−+−+−>−−+−
S
L
d
H
S
H
S
L
S
H
S
HH
d
H
S
H
S
H
S
H
p
gXp
p
gXpkNgXpgXp
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1())(1()(
λλ
λλ
 
This is fulfilled when they have illegal funds in the amount not higher than some 
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where subscript 1 stands for the first case when level of the observed market risk-free rate 
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These results mean that the higher is the risk-free market rate, so that H-type is more 
discriminated by the level of loan repayment relative to its quality, the more valuable is 
signalling for the H-type firms and they will do it even when they have to give up quite large 
sums of illegal sources. If there are many H-type firms in the market relative to the L-type 
firms, from which the former try to distinguish themselves, high quality firms are ready to 
sacrifices less amount of funds. Signalling is less valuable if there are few L-type firms and 
thus interest rate set by the bank in the pooling equilibrium is quite acceptable. Also better 
repayment possibilities of the L-type firms have the same negative influence on the 
willingness of H-firms to signal. The last condition shows that the more costly is for the firm 
to hide taxes the more likely it will refrain from doing it in order to obtain better loan 
conditions.  
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At the same time L-type firms will not mimic actions of the H-type if: 
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It is not profitable for the low quality firms to imitate the high ones if such action 
requires refusing from sufficiently large amounts of illegal resources. Clearly 11 ˆ~ NN < , so a 
standard condition for a signalling equilibrium to hold is that it is necessary for the H-type 
firms to give up at least amount 1~N . However, in our model it should be interpreted in a 
different way. The H-type firms will send a credible signal to the bank if the amount of 
illegal funds that they need to refrain from falls into the interval )ˆ,~( 11 NN , because they 
need to retrain from the whole sum N and it should be sufficient to prevent others from 
mimicking. 
So in terms of market parameters when a risk-free rate is rising, this interval is also 
increasing because of the larger increase in 1Nˆ  than in 1~N . So the equilibrium will hold for 
higher values of illegal funds and high value firms will be willing to give up larger sums that 
certainly will not make worthwhile for the low type to mimic. However, when the overall 
quality of the firms is improving this interval getting smaller and even much smaller by the 
larger decrease in 1Nˆ  than in 1~N . A possibility of the equilibrium in this case can be 
justified by the fact that less tax evasion and overdue debt will be relevant for economy with 
the increased quality. But those H-type firms that pursue to maintain large arrears will not be 
interested to distinguish themselves from the pool. 
2. Case XdH < r < XSH , with the rate S
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The non-mimicking condition in this case is fulfilled if: 
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As 22 ˆ~ NN < is fulfilled for pSH > pSL, kH > kL we will again have a signalling 
equilibrium for a corresponding level of N. 
It follows that in the case when the risk-free rate interest rate level is near but below 
average returns in the economy the critical levels for credible signalling possibilities depend 
also on the difference in the probabilities of successful outcomes for the H- and L-type 
firms. It is exactly the probabilities of repayment to the bank by these firms. If firms’ return 
distributions do not differ in this respect then they will be completely alike from the lender 
point of view.  
At the same time it can be seen from the conditions on g that if it is equal to E(X) we 
encounter in the situation of the case 3 with no borrowing by the H-type firms.  
It is interesting to notice that for some level of g we will have a subcase in which 
signalling can be even more profitable for the H-type as they will receive a risk-free rate 
gr signal = and will be able to repay the loan with certainty as in the first case.  
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Then the critical value is higher and this confirms improving possibilities for 
signalling. 
But in order to obtain a possible equilibrium region for N we need the following 
conditions for L-type to be satisfied: 
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However, critical level for L-type firms is lower now as we miss a multiplicative 
term 1/pSH > 1. Consequently, existence of such subcase can give the best signalling 
possibilities and higher occurrence of the equilibrium. 
3. The third case corresponds to the polling interest rate in the rage XSH < r < XSL, 
which creates infeasibility of the loan for the H-type firms. However, for some levels of the 
risk-free rate signalling can be possible even in this case, as signal will correspond to revised 
beliefs and the level of r that encourages to signal. The level of g for which the interest rate 
on loans for the H-type will be set as in the second case between XSH  and XSL is XdH [λ pSH 
+(1-λ)pSL] < g < XSH pSH  < E(X) . Then H-type can obtain interest rate S
H
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p
gr =  by 
signalling if the following two conditions are fulfilled: 
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From the comparison of the critical levels we can see that equilibrium can be 
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6.4 Policy recommendations for the market for corporate 
loans 
 
We will summarise obtained results in the table below: 
 
Table 5.  Signalling equilibrium conditions 
 
Level of rate r with 
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A signalling equilibrium was obtained in all four considered situations. The most 
important influence from the market on the likelihood of the occurrence in one of the 
considered cases is by the risk-free rate g. This rate can be formally considered on the level 
of the current refinancing rate set by the Central Bank. Referring to the financial and 
economic situation on the Russian market as described in the sections 2.2 and 2.3 it is more 
likely that this rate will lead to the second and third case as normal returns in the economy 
are still quite low in comparison with financial market returns. Thus, in absence of signalling 
possibilities we can have a situation with underinvestment by the high quality firms. 
Moreover, this will force banks to require a high return on their loans, which will attract 
only risky borrowers and worsen the pool of potential clients of the bank. Hence, a situation 
when banks have to increase their credit portfolios because of the absence of other profitable 
financial opportunities will expose them to a much higher risk. This can lead to high rate of 
defaults on loans and increased levels of overdue debt on their balances.  
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A possibility to provide a credible signal to the bank can be very valuable for the H-
type firms in terms of obtaining adequate to its quality interest rate on loans and a possibility 
to invest in a positive NPV projects in the latter case. In order to obtain lower interest rate it 
is worthwhile for these firms to reschedule their payments in such a way that they avoid any 
arrears and thus improve their financial record. It is natural to assume that the size of these 
arrears can be sufficiently small relative to the investment levels and it will be profitable to 
signal. While, for the L-type firms these funds are more valuable relative to the gain from 
cheaper credits. This happen both due to the lower informal costs of illegal funds and the 
whole structure of distribution of their investment returns. Moreover, riskiness of their 
returns makes them enjoying borrowing and thus investing in all considered cases. 
So we can conclude that signalling by the improvement of financial records and 
refraining from different forms of arrears by high quality firms in their economic activity 
creates a possibility to distinguish them from other firms. This in turn will result in lower 
interest rate on loans as the bank with have incentives to favour this group of borrowers and 
will require less return given higher probability of obtaining it.  However, the H-type firms 
are worse off comparing with the full-information case as they pay informational signalling 
costs, while L-type have the same outcome.  
H-type’s benefit form signalling compared with the private information case can be 
expressed in terms of saving on the interest on loans, while signalling costs equal to N. An 
important feature of the model is that these costs are neither a deadweight loss of the 
economy nor any wasted resources by the firms. These amounts is labelled costs only 
because it reduces firms profit and is sacrificed in order to prove its quality by the ability to 
do it. So these payments are going to their claimants and beneficial for the whole economy 
and from the social point of view.  
It is difficult and demanding to implement at once an efficient mechanism of legal 
enforcement, improve interactions between agents and confine all forms of illegal evasions. 
At the same time valuable effect can be obtained not only by legal procedures and 
enforcement but also by stimulating agents’ incentives and also norms of behaviour. “What 
is important is to recognise that changing of social norms can alter not only society but even 
the prices of goods and loans.”59  
How can policymakers encourage and promote signalling by the agents? There are 
several possibilities to promote better performance. For example, costs and risks of illegal 
                                                          
59 Basu (1984) 
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operations should be quite high. Then it would be unprofitable for most of the agents to stick 
to illegal methods and resources. Those who can benefit from legitimate behaviour should 
have enough incentives to provide convincing signals, which is a form of sharing private 
information and adding more certainty in relations between agents.   
At the same time, while high market rates and thus a risk-free rate observed by the 
bank formally stimulates signalling it is a dangerous factor as it leads to negative results. 
Market interest rate should not be higher than the average return for productive firms 
because financing and associated development will be unaffordable. However, even being 
lower than average return, risk-free rate can dangerously increase an uncertainty in 
repayments and even in extreme - impossibility to borrow by both types of firms. Then only 
exceptionally risky businesses, which are out of the consideration of this model, will survive 
and apply for bank loans. 
Another important mode of promoting signals concerns their costs. There are two 
sides of the problem: too low and too high costs. If signals are almost costless they may 
bring no information or be falsified and thus, be not credible. At the same time, agents will 
have no chance to benefit from signalling when is costs are too high. Concerning this 
particular model it means that a share of illegal funds utilised by the firms in the economy 
comparing to their financing needs should fall exactly into the equilibrium interval in each 
considered case of observed rate g, if we require a full signal, i.e. a complete indication of 
quality by showing N=0, to realise.  
It is natural that a decrease in the risk-free rate will make mimicking less profitable 
for the L-type firms. But apart of this in order to prevent falsified signals in the economy 
where credible business reputation is still not very common, it is necessary to improve 
requirements to the business conditions and technological process. It will positively 
influence firms’ quality by decrease managerial ambitious in taking extensive risks. It may 
have an ambiguous result for the signalling critical level as higher λ and lower costs k (due 
to lower σ2 ) will decrease N~ and Nˆ . While restricted financial reporting and unified 
standards of financial accounting together with general improvement in financial discipline 
can also cause higher informal costs for L-type firms, which increases N~ .  It is more natural 
that the total effect will be in favour of lower N~ . At the same time financial discipline will 
also create a proper environment and incentives for more ordered and payments in the 
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economy and thus total level of illegal funds utilised by the firms will be lower. All these 
can serve as possible signal facilitation devices according to this model.60  
                                                          
60 Cooper (1992) studied a signal facilitation approach for the market of used cars. 
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7. Conclusion and extensions 
Complex informational and legal environment creates additional uncertainty for the 
banks in their lending to the non-financial sector. Complicated bankruptcy law and 
cumbersome procedure of collateral realisation would decrease possible returns to the banks 
if they do not take these factors into account. The first model shows that apart of the effects 
of the oligopolistic competition the level of the interest rate on bank loans is influenced by 
the uncertainty of repayment, and following uncertain and costly procedure of compensation 
from the pledged assets. However, borrowers have an opportunity to manipulate with 
pledged assets, which results in a lower valuation of the pledged assets than their market 
value. As a consequence, relatively high repayment on loans, required by banks due to the 
high uncertainty and costs, together with the eroded collateral value, as view by the firms, 
may lead latter to choose a risky technology. This happen when high cost of loans along 
with a low level of prudence, reflected in lack of informational transparency and absence of 
the efficient enforcement mechanisms, create disincentives to use a stable technology. At the 
same time, improvement in the legal enforcement and relatively low interest rates will make 
a stable one more profitable. 
The model may be developed further in the attempt to reduce investments in the risky 
technology and avoid a situation when such investments can be profitable for the firm. It is 
interesting to obtain some incentive mechanism that will motivate the firm to invest 
efficiently. In a more complicated version of the model the required size of the collateral 
may be also endogenously determined in the model. As a possible extension, collateral value 
may be derived as a bargaining solution between the bank and the firm. The game can be 
played in tree stages with a bargaining over collateral on the last stage. Then the optimal 
solution will depend on the agents bargaining power in addition to their profit parameters.  
Providing a linkage from actual lenders (depositors) to borrowers, banks also have to 
be able to establish the creditworthiness of potential borrowers. Our model shows that banks 
are able to improve their strategies on the credit market even in the current situation of high 
uncertainty and doubtful returns if credible signals from their clients are possible. By 
building more transparent relationships with banks and other market agents and providing 
good quality financial records borrowers will be able to send such signal. The model results 
suggest that firms can adjust their behaviour by refraining from chronicle non-payments if 
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they need investments in their production process and can give up illegal funds in return for 
milder credit conditions. This will serve as an indication of their efficient performance and 
ability to repay loans. The bank then conducts a particular credit policy separating high-risk 
borrowers from the low-risk ones and adjusts its interest rate on loans accordingly. L-type 
firms will continue to borrow even at a high rate as limited liability and high upper values of 
their return distribution still make them to benefit from investing than from forgoing the 
project. What is more important, high quality firms will be rewarded by banks with lower 
interest rate on loans and will be able to finance their investment needs with lower costs. In 
an extended version this model can be combined with the previous one. Then both collateral 
requirement and interest rate on loans will be determined from the banks’ problem in such a 
way that the moral hazard is prevented and the firms invest efficiently. However, this 
analysis may become very complicated due to the presence of both hidden action and hidden 
information problem, as the firms still need to distinguish themselves for the banks and 
provide a credible signal. In addition to the mentioned conditions, it is possible to extend the 
analysis for a continuum of types and some form of the continuos investment return 
distribution. This can be a task for the further research.  
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